Russell’s Second Philosophy of Time (1899–1913) by Milkov, Nikolay
 
 
 188 
Russell’s Second Philosophy of Time (1899–1913) 
Nikolay Milkov, Bielefeld, Germany 
1. Introduction 
Russell’s second philosophy of time (1899–1913), which 
will be the subject of this paper, is of special interest for 
two reasons. (1) It was basic to his New Philosophy, later 
called the “philosophy of logical atomism”. In fact, this 
philosophy didn’t initially emerge in the period of 1914–
1919, as many interpreters (e.g. A. J. Ayer) suggest, but 
with the introduction of Russell’s second philosophy of time 
(and space). The importance of Russell’s second philos-
ophy of time for his early and middle philosophy can be 
seen from the fact that it survived the dramatic changes in 
his philosophy of August–December 1900, and of July 
1905. There is of course no surprise about this point: it 
served as their fundament. (2) Russell’s second philos-
ophy of time is a locus classicus of all so called B-theories 
of time which define it in terms of the relations of before, 
after and simultaneous between events or moments. 
2. Russell’s Second Philosophy of Time in 
Its Relation to His Other Philosophies of 
Time 
In different periods of his philosophical development, 
Russell adopted two opposite positions in the philosophy 
of time: relative and absolute. Roughly speaking, the 
relational theory was held by Leibniz and Lotze, while the 
absolute theory by Newton. The relational theory claims 
that there is no time as such (or absolute time) but rather a 
succession of interrelated events (or contents of time). The 
absolute theory holds that events occur at moments, or 
absolute times, and that it is these moments that occur one 
after another. Two events are simultaneous if they occur at 
the same moment, and successive when they occur at two 
successive moments.  
Of course, it does not take much effort to notice that 
the two theories are built on similar principles: They both 
are B-theories of time. Russell’s B-theory can also be char-
acterized as defending four-dimensionalism: a doctrine 
which holds that objects have temporal as well as spatial 
parts. In metaphysics he denied the presentism of 
McTaggart, or the view that everything which exists is 
present, and defended the position that time is real. 
In his philosophical development Russell proposed 
at least three philosophies of time. (i) In 1897 he 
advocated a relational theory of time. (ii) From 1899 till 
1913 he held an absolute theory of time—it is this theory 
that will interest us here. (iii) A major revolution occurred in 
Russell’s thinking about time (and space) in 1914 when he 
stopped accepting matter as it appears in physics and tried 
to see it through the private world of sense-data. He found 
that physical objects are not to be inferred from sense data 
but must rather be constructed from them. In philosophy of 
time this led to his refusal to accept moments, or instants, 
and his defining them in terms of classes of “overlapping” 
events instead (cf. Russell 1914, 122 ff.). Now he claimed 
that time is a relation of events; there are no moments. In 
this way Russell returned—but on a different level—to the 
old relational theory of time. 
 
3. The History of Russell’s Seconds 
Philosophy of Time 
Though idealistic, Russell’s philosophy was pluralistic from 
the very beginning. His motivation for accepting pluralism 
were two early beliefs of his: First, in order for thinking to 
be possible at all, its object must be complex. Indeed, a 
simple thing “is unthinkable, since every object of thought 
can only be thought by means of some complexity”. (1896, 
564) Secondly, this complexity can be achieved only when 
referring to unique individuals (terms), which are different 
from any other individual. This was the kernel of Russell’s 
atomism.1 
Thus Russell’s The Foundations of Geometry 
(finished in October 1896) claimed that the objects of 
cognition have to be complex: in order to know them, we 
must be able to differentiate between them; and in order to 
differentiate between them, they must be external to 
(divergent from) one another. This is the Principle of 
Differentiation, which is based on the Form of Externality of 
individuals (terms). There are two forms of externality, 
space and time, which are most important for us humans. 
In this connection, Russell accepted that two time-points 
(moments) can be different only when mutually external (in 
contrast, two events can happen together in time). This is 
the first a priori knowledge about time and is so the first 
axiom of metaphysics.  
Russell’s first philosophy of time was advanced in 
his paper “Why Do We Regard Time, But Not Space, as 
Necessarily a Plenum”, which was written towards the end 
of May 1897 (but published first in 1990). In the paper 
Russell criticized the widely-held belief that time is an 
adjective (predicate), “while space is regarded as possibly 
a relation” (Russell 1897, 92). He, in contrast, insisted that 
space and time have the same logical structure: they are 
both based on relations.  
This stance was to characterize Russell’s position 
on time in all his periods. His different philosophies of time 
were the effect of different conceptions of the type of 
relations which lay at the bottom of time. Although still an 
idealist, in 1897 Russell insisted that relations cannot be 
reduced to properties: relations exist and are real. He 
claimed further that the position on this problem is of 
utmost importance since the solution of the controversy 
monism / pluralism depends on it and this is “the most 
fundamental question of metaphysics” (p. 97). And from 
Russell’s claim that relations cannot be reduced to 
predicates, it followed that monism is untenable. He further 
made the distinction between absolute and relational 
theory of time. At this point, however, he cannot decide 
whether space and time are relational or absolute. 
Russell accepted the absolute theory of time, first, in 
the paper “Is Position in Time Absolute or Relative?”, read 
on 9 May 1900 to the Oxford Philosophical Society. The 
paper was first published in 1993, in the 3rd vol. of 
Russell’s Collected Papers, and this explains why it was 
not discussed in the press so far. Another paper of his 
from this period is “The Notion of Order and Absolute 
Position in Space and Time”, which was read at the 
                                                     
1 Its alternative is the metaphysics of “atomless gunk” which was explored only 
recently (cf. Zimmerman 1996). 
Russell’s Second Philosophy of Time (1899-1913) - Nikolay Milkov 
 
 
 
 189
historical (for him!) International Congress of Philosophy in 
August 1900 in Paris; it was published the next year in 
French (see Russell 1901a). On the basis of this paper 
Russell prepared a third one, “Is Position in Time and 
Space Absolute or Relative?”, which he published the next 
year in Mind (see Russell 1901b). The two papers overlap 
on many points. A substantial part of the third paper was 
reprinted in the Principles, Ch. LI, (§§ 424–31). I must note 
here, however, that his theory was best articulated in the 
first paper, “Is Position in Time Absolute or Relative?”. This 
explains why in what follows we shall concentrate on it. 
4. Russell’s Absolute Philosophy of Time of 
1900 
Russell’s first claim is that his problem is that of logic, not 
of metaphysics: “The problem concerning temporal 
position is one which takes us to the foundations of logic.” 
(Russell 1900, 225) Further, he insists that his philosophy 
(logic) of time is a concretization of his: 
 
(i) theory of series (to be discussed in § 5);  
(ii) which, in turn, depends of the theory of 
relations ( first developed in the paper “The 
Classification of Relations”, given in January 
1899 to the Cambridge Moral Sciences Club);  
(iii) which, finally, depends upon his theory of 
judgment. In the latter, Russell followed the 
ideas developed in Moore’s paper “The 
Nature of Judgment” (1899).2  
In order to elucidate the absolute theory of time, in its 
divergence from the relational theory, Russell first points 
out the ambiguity of the word “event”. On the one hand, an 
event can be taken to mean simply something which exists 
at a time; on the other hand, it can be taken to mean 
something together with the time at which it exists; i.e. an 
event may be defined either simply by its content, or by the 
complex consisting of its content together with its 
(absolute) temporal position.3,4 In the former sense, 
toothache is an event; in the latter sense, a particular bout 
of toothache is an event. In the first, more abstract sense 
Russell speaks of qualities, and only in the second sense 
of events proper. Now, the relational theory is interested in 
qualities, or in the content of events; events obtain by 
mutual relations of qualities. In contrast, the absolute 
theory accepts that there are different (absolute) moments, 
which, in combination with these qualities, form events. 
Russell rejects the relational theory, since he 
believes that it destroys the construction of the time-series, 
which depends, as do all series, upon the mutual 
incompatibility of the constitutive elements. He insists that 
the elements of the time-series must not only be related to 
one another; they must also differ from one another—and 
this in such a way that even indiscernibles should not be 
treated as identical. In order to achieve this, Russell 
accepts that all simultaneous events have a certain 
common quality of transitiveness, and this quality is their 
temporal position, which makes even events of the same 
quality (i.e. indiscernibles) different one from another. 
Russell claims further that the simultaneity implies 
identity of content, whereas the succession implies 
                                                     
2 Both Moore and Russell, however, were conscious that the theory of 
judgment is not sufficiently elaborated in it . 
3 Obviously, Russell’s second philosophy of time was based on the logic (and 
ontology) of simples and complexes. 
4 Apparently, to Russell an event has content, in the same way in which a 
judgment has content. This point shows the connection between his theory of 
time and his logic, in particular, to his (Moore’s) theory of judgment. 
diversity of content. This means that qualities cannot be 
the atom of time, for the simple reason that these can be 
both simultaneous and successive. “The definiteness of 
the time-series requires that we should be able to 
distinguish between A now and A then. That is, in all cases 
of repetition, there [. . . must be] some difference of 
content, not contained in the quality A itself, which enables 
us to distinguish the first occurrence from the second.” 
(228) 
To meet this requirement, Russell accepts that 
relations of time hold between events. There is, in 
particular, a collection of contents (or moments) α, β and a 
collection of qualities A, B. The quality A becomes an 
event Aα by possession of the content (or when it is at a 
certain moment) α. The quality A possessing the content 
(or being at a certain moment) α is the event Aα. In 
accordance with this definition, we can call simultaneous 
two qualities which have one and the same content (or are 
at the same moment) (Aα and Bα). What are referred to as 
successive are different qualities at the same moment, or 
at different moments (Bα and Aα, or Aα and Bβ). Now is an 
identity of content (moment) among events which are now. 
Russell expresses the absolute theory of time also 
this way. “We have on the one hand a series of moments, 
each of which is before or after every other moment; 
moments form a series in virtue of these transitive 
asymmetrical relations of before and after. On the other 
hand, we have a collection of qualities, not forming a 
series, but capable of the relation expressed by at to one 
or many moments of time. Repetition occurs where one 
quality is at several moments. Simultaneity occurs where 
several qualities are at one moment. The complex formed 
by a quality at a moment is an event; thus every event has 
a position in the time-series expressed by the moment at 
which it is, and indeed the moments are the position of the 
events.” (p. 230) 
The moments of time are atoms in the sense that 
they are unanalyzable and indefinable, in the same way in 
which red and blue are indefinables. They are different 
from one another, and this difference is prior to any other 
difference of relation. The relations themselves “are rather 
like Platonic ideas, real entities, which, even if they do not 
live and move, yet have their being among the constituents 
of the universe.” (p. 229) 
5. Other Types of Series 
Russell claims further that the absolute theory is correct in 
all cases of series. There are different types of series: 
integers, colors, space, time. In all of them, so Russell, if a 
number of terms occupies the same position, the position 
is really a new term, distinct from all of them. By some 
cases the logical status of the series can be decided by 
inspection. “For example, the integers form a series, and 
by relation to these, collections to various numbers of 
terms also form a series.” (225) The same with the colors; 
indeed, there is clearly such a thing as a color. A 
“relational theory of color”, however, would claim that there 
are no colors at all but just colored objects—which is 
perceptibly absurd. By other types of series, though, the 
logical status cannot be decided by inspection alone. 
Russell’s guess (or hypothesis) is that “in cases where, as 
with numbers and colors, these positions have names, the 
absolute theory is plainly correct. But where they have no 
names, language does not help our philosophizing, and we 
are apt to suppose that what is unnamed is nothing.” (226) 
Here are three examples of this: 
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(i) In time, dates do, to some extent, afford 
names for periods. 
(ii) A slightly more difficult case is presented by 
quantities. Quantity is one thing, but the size, 
or the magnitude that it has, is something 
quite different from it. Relational theory, 
though, denies the magnitudes and accepts 
only quantities. 
(iii)  “In the case of space, this difficulty becomes 
still greater; for places are named by the 
objects in them, and all known objects are 
perpetually moving. Events have at least the 
advantage of a fixed position in time, but 
material objects have no fixed position in 
space.” (226)  
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